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MASSACHUSETIS LAW-LANDLORD-TENANT TORT LAw­
AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE 
-AN ANALYSIS OF FUTURE IMPLICATIONs-Great Atlantic & Pa­
cific Tea Co. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897, 403 N.E.2d 
370. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Yanofsky! effected three significant 
changes in landlord-tenant law. The decision abolished two tradi­
tional rules concerning landlord-tenant tort law and established a 
new, progressive rule. The "failure to repair" rule2 had directed 
that a landlord who entered into an agreement to repair leased 
premises and who knowingly refused to make necessary repairs 
could not be held liable in tort. Instead, the landlord could be 
found liable only on a contract theory for the cost of making the re­
pairs. Yanofsky abolished this rule. 3 The landlord in this case was 
held liable in tort for the foreseeable consequences of his failure to 
make repairs. 
Yanofsky overruled a prior supreme judicial court decision, 
Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 4 which held that a 
lessor's failure to repair a screen in accordance with the parties' 
oral agreement was an omission and did not give rise to an action 
in tort. The Chelefou decision rested on the distinction between 
the landlord's nonfeasance and his misfeasance. 5 Nonfeasance 
would result if a landlord agreed to make repairs and failed to do 
so. Under this theory, he could be held liable only for the cost of 
making the repairs. 6 If, on the other hand, a landlord agreed to 
make repairs but did so in a negligent manner, he would have 
been held liable for misfeasance. Parties injured by the landlord's 
misfeasance were allowed to recover against him in tort. 7 Another 
facet of this rule governed the consequences when a landlord made 
1. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 897, 403 N.E.2d 370. 
2. See generally Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919); Tuttle 
v. George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). 
3. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374. 
4. 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937). 
5. Id. at 240, 8 N.E.2d at 772. 
6. Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919). 
7. Id. 
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repairs gratuitously in the absence of an express agreement to re­
pair. He was held liable for injuries caused by the faulty repairs 
only if the plaintiff could prove gross negligence. 8 
By implicitly overruling Chelefou , Yanofsky laid to rest the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance that commonly 
had been relied on to determine liability in earlier decisions. 9 Nei­
ther the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance nor the 
failure to repair rule itself was considered by the Yanofsky court to 
be responsive to contemporary views of the landlord-tenant rela­
tionship. A Massachusetts landlord who simply refuses to repair 
unsafe conditions on rental premises no longer can avoid tort liabil­
ity while a landlord who in good faith attempts to make such re­
pairs is held liable in tort for repairing in a negligent manner. 
The most significant aspect of Yanofsky, however, is its hold­
ing concerning a landlord's liability to his tena~t for injuries suf­
fered by third parties. The court found that a lessor's express 
agreement to make repairs "should be construed as an agreement 
to indemnify the lessee against any loss or damage sustained by 
him"lO as a result of injury incurred by third parties due to the 
landlord's failure to make repairs. 11 By implying an agreement to 
indemnify, the court significantly expanded its protection of inno­
cent tenants: tenants are now insulated from liability incurred as a 
result of unsafe premises. 
This note discusses both the evolution of the rules governing 
the landlord-tenant relationship and the immediate effects of 
Yanofsky on landlord-tenant tort issues in light of their historical 
origins. The probable impact of the Yanofsky decision on four addi­
tional aspects of landlord-tenant law then will be explored: 
Whether an agreement to indemnify will be implied in a residen­
tiallease from an express agreement to repair;12 whether an agree­
ment to indemnify will be implied in a residential lease in the ab­
sence of an express agreement to repair;13 whether an agreement 
to repair will be implied in a commercial lease;14 and whether an 
8. Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 398, 124 N.E. 74, 84 (1919). 
9. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374. 
10. Id. (emphasis added). 
11. Id. 
12. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra. 
13. See text accompanying notes 180-91 infra .. 
14. See text accompanying notes 194-209 infra. 
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agreement to indemnify will be implied in a commercial lease 
which does not include an express agreement to repair. 15 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1950 a lease agreement was executed between plaintiff, 
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) , and the owner of 
the property which was later acquired by defendant, Robert 
Yanofsky.I6 The lease was for a term of five years with options to 
renew. I7 A & P renewed the lease six times, the last renewal to 
expire in 1980. 18 The lease agreement provided for the lessee, A & 
P, to make all necessary incidental interior repairs and for the les­
sor to make all outside repairs. I9 The lease also included a provi­
sion granting the lessor a right of access at reasonable hours to in­
spect and make repairs. 2o All provisions in the lease dealing with 
responsibility for repairs were "continued in force with each re­
newal, and were in effect at the time [of the accident which gave 
rise to this lawsuit]. "21 
A &. P's store manager first discovered a leak in the roof in De­
cember of 1974. 22 On December 17, 1974, the store manager 
wrote a letter informing the lessor, Yanofsky, of the leak. 23 
Upon receiving the letter Yanofsky took steps to insure that the 
roof would be repaired. 24 While awaiting repair of the roof, A & P 
employees attempted to reduce the potential danger caused by the 
wet floor. Buckets were strategically placed to catch the water 
dripping from the leaky roof 25 The water on the floor was mopped 
up on various occasions. 26 In addition, shopping carts were used to 
15. See text accompanying notes 194-213 illfra. 
16. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 898,403 N.E.2d at 371-72. 
17. ld. at 898, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
18. ld. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. Nothing in the record indicates that the lessor was prevented from mak­
ing such repairs. 
21. leI. 
22. leI. 
23. leI. 
24. Several years prior to the date in question, a roofing contractor had been 
hired to build a new roof on the store in order to remedy similar leakage problems. 
The testimony of Yanofsky at trial showed that he unsuccessfully tried to contact the 
roofer by telephone. Yanofsky then sent him a letter, dated December 19, 1974, re­
questing that necessary repairs be made. ld. 
25. leI. at 898-99, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
26. ld. 
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detour customers away from the hazardous area. 27 No repairs were 
made, however. On December 23, 1974 a customer, Mrs. Marie 
Vahey, slipped and fell, fracturing her hip.28 No precautions were 
taken by A & P on the day of the accident. 29 
Counsel for Mrs. Vahey negotiated a settlement with A & P 
for $20,000. 30 Mrs. Vahey agreed to settle for this amount and on 
September 25, 1975 executed a release of all claims against A & 
P.31 She expressly reserved her right to file suit against all other 
parties. 32 Mrs. Vahey then filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior 
Court against Yanofsky. That action, after joinder with the instant 
suit by A & P against Yanofsky for indemnification, was settled in 
midtrial. 33 In the action for indemnification, defendant, Yanofsky, 
moved for a directed verdict after plaintiff had presented its case 
and again after all the evidence had been presented. 34 In his 
motions Yanofsky challenged plaintiffs evidence as insufficient to 
support a jury finding of an express or implied agreement for in­
demnification. He further contended "that the evidence was insuf­
ficient to warrant the jury in finding that A & P incurred damages 
as a result of Yanofsky's breach of any terms of the lease."35 Both 
motions were denied. 36 
The jury found that A & P had acted reasonably in settling 
Mrs. Vahey's claim,37 that the injury to Mrs. Vahey was a reason­
ably foreseeable result of Yanofsky's failure to make repairs,38 that 
A & P was not contributorily negligent,39 and that an implied 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
29. Id. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 376. 
30. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
31. ld. 
32. ld. 
33. ld. at 899 n.3, 403 N.E.2d at 372 n.3. 
34. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
35. ld. at 897-98, 403 N.E.2d at 371. 
36. ld. at 899, 403 N.E.2d at 372. 
37. ld. at 906, 403 N.E.2d at 376. 
38. ld. at 904, 403 N.E.2d at 375. 
39. ld. Contributory negligence on the part of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Co. [hereinafter referred to as A & P] had been asserted due to the condition of floor 
tiles at the time the leak was discovered. The tiles were alleged to be uneven and in 
need of repair. The supreme judicial court found the judge's instructions to the jury 
to be sufficient regarding contributory negligence. "The judge clearly and repeatedly 
instructed the jury that if they found negligence on the part of A & P, the latter 
could not recover in indemnification." ld. at 905-06, 403 N.E.2d at 376. 
357 1980] LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 
agreement to indemnifY arose from Yanofsky's express agreement 
to make repairs. 40 
The supreme judicial court affirmed the superior court's denial 
of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 41 The court held that 
Yanofsky's duty to make all outside repairs obligated him to rem­
edy the hazard created by the leaky roof within a reasonable time 
of notification. 42 The court reasoned that because the lease's terms 
were unambiguous regarding the agreement to repair, there was 
no factual dispute concerning the existence of an implied agree­
ment to indemnifY.43 Thus, the agreement to indemnifY was im­
plied as a matter of law. 44 The court mentioned, but did not rely 
upon, the legislative intent· of chapter 186, section 19 of the 
Massachusetts General Laws which states that a lessor must exer­
cise reasonable care to correct, within a reasonable time, any 
unsafe condition which he knows or ought to know exists. 45 The 
statute provides any victim injured while lawfully on the premises 
with a right of action against the lessor.46 The Yanofsky court rea­
soned: 
[T]hat a lessee ... that is "injured" by virtue of being reasonably 
obliged to settle a claim for personal injuries which were caused 
by the lessor's failure to repair an unsafe condition within a rea­
40. hi. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 375. 
41. ld. at 906, 403 N.E.2d at 376. 
42. ld. at 901-02, 403 N.E.2d at 373. 
43. ld. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 373-74. 
44. ld. 
45. ld. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977) states that: 
A landlord or lessor of any real estate except an owner-occupied two- or 
three-family dwelling shall, within a reasonable time following receipt of a 
written notice from a tenant forwarded by registered or certified mail of an 
unsafe condition, not caused by the tenant, his invitee, or anyone occupying 
through or under the tenant, exercise reasonable care to correct the unsafe 
condition described in said notice except that such notice need not be given 
for unsafe conditions in that portion of the premises not under control of the 
tenant. The tenant or any person rightfully on said premises injured as a re­
sult of the failure to correct said unsafe condition within a reasonable time 
shall have a right of action in tort against the landlord or lessor for damages. 
Any waiver of this provision in any lease or other rental agreement shall be 
void and unenforceable. The notice requirement of this section shall be 
satisfied by a notice from a board of health or other code enforcement 
agency to a landlord or lessor of residential premises not exempted by the 
provisions of this section of a violation of the state sanitary code or other ap­
plicable by-laws, ordinances, rules or regulations. 
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). 
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sonable time, would have a cause of action against the lessor un­
der the statute to recover such amounts reasonably paid.47 
Because Yanofsky breached his duty to repair, the lessee, A & P, 
incurred an economic loss. The court held that the lessor's "express 
agreement to make repairs should be construed as an agreement to 
indemnifY the lessee. "48 
The court also held that the landlord's failure to make repairs 
in accordance with the agreement gave rise to a tort action. 49 Un­
der the common-law failure to repair rule, the appropriate remedy 
would have been an action for breach of contract by A & P against 
Yanofsky for the cost of repairing the roof. In holding as it did, the 
court abolished the common-law rule that a lessor's failure to re­
pair, a nonfeasance, obligates him to pay only the cost of repairs. 50 
This decision was the logical culmination of a trend, which began 
in Massachusetts in 1973, to hold landlords to a higher standard of 
care than had previously been imposed upon them. 51 
Since 1973, the Massachusetts courts have come to accept the 
modern view that a lease is not a conveyance of an interest in 
land52 but rather is an exchange of covenants more akin to a con­
tract. When a lease was perceived as a conveyance of property, it 
was assumed that the tenant took complete control of the premises 
when he took possession. The landlord, therefore, had no right to 
enter or inspect and consequently could not be expected to make 
repairs. 53 Thus, the tenant, being in total control of the premises, 
was believed to be in the best position to make the necessary re­
pairs. 54 The contemporary view of a lease as a contractual exchange 
of promises, however, recognizes that the lessor, as well as the les­
see, has obligations with regard to the maintenance of the prem­
47. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374. 
48. ld. 
49. ld. at 901-02, 403 N.E.2d at 373-74. 
50. The rule was first espoused in Massachusetts in 1887. The supreme judicial 
court held that a lessor was not Iiable'in tort for injuries to a farmer and his cow 
when both fell through the floor of a rented barn. The lessor had agreed to repair the 
rotted floor and had failed to do so. Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 
169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). 
51. See text accompanying notes 150-71 infra. 
52. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 
See notes 150-54 infra and accompanying text. 
53. See Quinn & Phillips, The Late of Landlord-Tenallt: A Critical Evaluation 
of the Past With Guideli,Jes for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (1970). 
54. ld. at 231-32. For a comparison of modern and agrarian tenants, see Javins 
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 
925 (1970). 
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ises. The law eventually began to recognize the fact that the mod­
ern tenant is less able to make repairs than the landlord. 55 This has 
resulted in the imposition of increased responsibility on landlords 
to maintain the premises in a safe condition. The outcome of the 
accompanying change in judicial thinking is greater protection for 
those who are injured as a result of unsafe conditions on rented 
property. The duty imposed on a landlord to use reasonable care in 
maintaining his property has expanded accordingly. 56 To fully un­
derstand Yanofsky's place in this scheme and its present and future 
implications, it is necessary to trace the history of the landlord­
tenant relationship. 
III. 	 HISTORY OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The landlord-tenant relationship in the United States was orig­
inally governed by the principle that a lease was the equivalent of 
a conveyance of property from a landlord to a tenant. 57 This idea 
was consistent with both parties' expectations in a rural agrarian so­
ciety.58 Tenants were concerned with the land itself for they made 
their living and paid their rent through farming. 59 Thus, it was of 
great importance to tenants that they have exclusive possession of 
the property, free from the lessor's interference. The landlord's 
duty was merely to deliver possession and refrain from interfering 
with the tenant's possessory rights. 60 The tenant's duty to pay rent 
was independent of his right to use and possess the premises. 61 No 
guarantees or warranties attached to the leased property because 
55. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 239. 
56. See text accompanying notes 150-70 infra. 
57. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
902, 403 N.E.2d at 374; Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 731, 402 
N.E.2d 1045, 1047; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293 
N.E.2d 831, 837, 840 (1973); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62, 67 (1809). 
58. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89, 293 N.E.2d 831, 
837 (1973). 
59. "[T]he governing idea is that the land is bound to pay the rent. ... [W]e 
may almost go to the length of saying that the land pays it through [the tenant's] 
hand." 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW § 6, at 131 
(2d ed. 1898). 
60. "In other words, for the term of the lease, the lands were subject to the ten­
ant's, not the landlord's care and concern." Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 228. 
61. "Thus, originally at common law, the tenant could not even escape his 
rental obligations when the demised premises were destroyed because of the law's 
view that the land and not the premises was the essential part of the transaction." 
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189,293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973). 
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the buildings were considered to be of minimal importance. In 
fact, the tenants considered the structures built on the leased land 
to be incidental to the lease. 62 Thus, the property was leased "as 
is." Absent fraud, the landlord had no duty to repair buildings, to 
assure that the premises would be maintained in a safe condition, 
or to compensate those who might be injured on the rented prem­
ises. 63 This doctrine was known as "caveat emptor" or "buyer be­
ware."64 
The landlord implicitly warranted that the tenant's quiet en­
joyment would be undisturbed for the term of the lease. 65 The 
landlord had no right to enter or inspect the premises without the 
tenant's permission. 66 Since the landlord never had an opportunity 
to discover defective conditions, the common-law perception that a 
landlord could not be expected to keep rented premises in repair 
was justified. 
This system worked well for both parties. In fact, the view of a 
lease as a conveyance of property in some circumstances was an ad- . 
vantage to a tenant. 67 Although the lessee could not rely on the 
lessor for assistance in making repairs, he had what he really 
wanted: Land to farm; privacy; and quiet. 68 The typical lessee was 
capable of making the repairs necessary to keep his dwelling in a 
safe, habitable condition. 69 The tenant did not need, and probably 
did not desire, to have the landlord regularly on the premises. 
Furthermore, early agrarian tenants often would rent property for 
62. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 11221, at 178-79 (1977). 
63. Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502,204 N.E.2d 448 (1905). See generally 2 
R. POWELL, supra note 62, 11 233, at 330.69. The parties could, if they wished, agree 
that the lessor would make all repairs. 
64. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 \1ass. 184, 188, 293 N.E.2d 831, 
837 (1973). 
65. Comment, Judicial Expansioll of Tellallts' Private Law Rights: Implied 
Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL 
L. REV. 489, 490 (1971). 
66. "The landlord was IlOt expected to assist in the operation of the land. Quite 
the reverse, he was expected to stay as far away as possible." Quinn & Phillips, su­
pra note 53, at 228 (emphasis in original). 
67. The early common law, in accepting the notion of a lease as a conveyance, 
developed the principle that "a real action of ejectment, rather than a contractual ac­
tion of debt," could be used to enforce the tenant's legal rights. The action of eject­
ment was the preferred method of enforcement. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defec­
tive Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 
19,26. 
68. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 226-31. 
69. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
de/lied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). 
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long terms or for an entire lifetime. 7o The tenant's long-term inter­
est operated as an incentive for him to make repairs since he could 
enjoy the fruits of his labor for many years. 
The agrarian framework of American society changed as the 
nation became industrialized. Urban areas began to emerge, draw­
ing people from all parts of the nation as well as from Europe. 
Urban growth was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the 
rural population.71 Consequently, commercial and residential 
leases in urban areas increased in importance. 72 The people who 
relocated to these urban centers needed apartments rather than 
the quiet enjoyment of a piece of fertile farmland. In return for his 
rent the tenant expected a safe, comfortable place to live. The 
urban tenant hardly could be called self-sufficient, and "the last 
thing he wanted was to be left alone. "73 Apartment and commer­
cial buildings were equipped with complex heating, electrical, and 
plumbing systems. 74 Surely the vast majority of modem apartment 
dwellers could not be expected to have the resources or knowledge 
necessary to make repairs on such systems. 75 "Agrarian self reli­
ance in this context ... [was] simply not possible. "76 
As these economic and social changes altered the landlord­
tenant relationship, the courts remained stagnant, adhering to ar­
chaic common-law rules and ideas. 77 Various jurisdictions within 
the United States began to seek remedies for the resulting injus­
tices. Not until the twentieth century did most jurisdictions recog­
nize that landlord-tenant law had to be reevaluated in light of the 
radical changes which had taken place since colonial times. 78 The 
70. 1 d. at 1078-79. 
71. Love, supra note 67, at 26. 
72. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 62, at 180. 
73. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 231. 
74. ld. See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. dellied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). 
75. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 231-32. 
76. ld. at 231. 
77. "Since the courts demonstrated no willingness to modify the common law, 
it became necessary for the legislatures to take corrective action." Love, supra note 
67, at 38. 
78. In 1970, Judge Skelly Wright, in his oft-quoted historical analysis of the ob­
ligations of landlords, concluded that the time for change had at last arrived. 
It is overdue for courts to admit that these assumptions are no longer true 
with regard to all urban housing. Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of 
whom live in multiple dwelling houses, are interested, not in the land, but 
solely in 'a house suitable for occupation.' Furthermore, today's city 
dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance 
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Massachusetts courts and legislature were slow to respond to the 
cry for reform in many areas of landlord-tenant law. 79 Massa­
chusetts' strict adherence to the common-law principle that a lease 
was a conveyance of an interest in land continued until 1973, when 
the principle was invalidated by the supreme judicial court in 
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway.8o Only after Hemingway 
rejected the archaic conveyance principle did Massachusetts courts 
begin to formulate progressive rules and thus embark upon the com­
mendable, new trend of decisions in which Yanofsky plays such an 
important role. 81 
IV. YANOFSKY AND THE DEMISE OF THE FAILURE 

TO REPAIR RULE 

In Massachusetts, the old common-law rules of landlord-tenant 
law were not challenged until the late nineteenth and early twenti­
work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who 
was the common law's model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian 
predecessor who often remained on one piece of land for his entire life, 
urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before. A tenant's tenure in a 
specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. In 
addition, the increasing complexity of today's dwellings renders them much 
more difficult to repair than the structures of earlier times. In [sic] a multi ­
ple dwelling repair may require access to equipment and areas in the con­
trol of the landlord. Low and middle income tenants, even if they were in­
terested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for 
major repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property. 
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See also Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Land­
lord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 383 (1928). 
79. Regarding the landlord's duty to repair common passageways one commen­
tator noted, "The Massachusetts court has been more lenient toward the landlord 
and has held the tenant more strictly to the maxim caveat emptor." Harkrider, supra 
note 78, at 403 n.172. 
Regarding situations such as those occurring in Yanofsky, where "land is leased 
for a purpose which involves the admission of the public," most states agree that a 
landlord must use reasonable care in inspecting and repairing before possession is 
transferred. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 403 (4th ed. 
1971). "Massachusetts appears to be quite alone to the contrary." ld. at n.40. 
Regarding the landlord's liability for nonperformance of his agreement to repair, 
a "slowly increasing number of the courts, which ... [had] reached a slight majority 
[had] worked out a liability in tort for such injuries to person or property...." ld. 
at 409. 
For a more complete review of the state of the law in other jurisdictions, see id. 
at 399-412. 
80. 363 Mass. 184, 197, 293 N.E.2d 831, 841 (1973). 
81. See text accompanying notes 150-71 infra. 
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eth centuries. 82 These challenges were not successful, however, 
until 1973. 83 
One of the early rules that insulated lessors from tort liability 
was stated in 1887 in Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Manufacturing 
CO.84 Tuttle held that no cause of action in tort existed against a 
lessor who breached his agreement to make repairs. 85 In 1919 the 
rule was reaffirmed in Fiorntino v. Mason. 86 Plaintiff in Fiorntino 
was injured when she fell down a flight of stairs. The landlord had 
been notified that the stairs were defective and had made an oral 
agreement to repair them when he was notified of the defects. 87 
According to the court, failure to comply with such an agreement 
gave rise merely to a right of action for breach of contract, where 
the damages commonly are only the cost of repairs. 88 The court ad­
hered to this rule89 and found no evidence to support an award of 
tort damages under any other theory.90 The rule followed by the 
court was based "upon the concept that a lease was to be consid­
ered as purely a conveyance of property."91 The lease was con­
strued as a conveyance so that the tenant had an exclusive right to 
possession and a duty to pay rent, independent of the landlord's 
82. See Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 124 N.E. 283 (1919); Tuttle v. 
George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). See text accompa­
nying notes 84-94 infra. 
83. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Boston Hous. 
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 184, 293 N.E.2d at 831. For a detailed discussion 
of Mounsey and Hemingway, see text accompanying notes 150-71 infra. See also 
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), in which the Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court reached a decision recognizing an implied warranty of habita­
bility in leases of furnished rooms or furnished houses. The court held that one who 
rented a furnished house or room need not tolerate uninhabitable conditions. In­
stead, tenants under such circumstances could expect, and rely on the fact, that the 
premises would be fit to live in when delivered. The court reasoned that tenants 
were contracting for premises fit for immediate use more than for a lease of real es­
tate. Caveat emptor, if applied in such a case, would be unjust. Id. at 350,31 N.E. at 
286. 
84. 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E. 465 (1887). 
85. ld. at 175, 13 N.E. at 467. 
86. 233 Mass. 451, 124 N .E. 283 (1919). 
87. At trial the plaintiff was asked: "Q. And then he [landlord] said he would 
repair those stairs? A. Yes, 'I [landlord] would repair the stairs, and fix the lower 
stairs way up.''' Id. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284. 
88. Id. at 453, 124 N.E. at 283. 
89. [d. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284. 
90. [d. at 456, 124 N.E. at 285. 
91. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Yanofsky, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
902,403 N.E.2d at 374; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 188-89,293 
N.E.2d at 837, 840. 
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obligation to make repairs. The lessor's duty was to deliver posses­
sion to the tenant; he had no right to interfere with the tenant's ex­
clusive possessory interest. The landlord could not enter, inspect, 
or repair the premises in the tenant's possession without the ten­
ant's permission. Thus, because the tenant had a better opportu­
nity to repair, the burden for making repairs was placed on him. 92 
This reasoning demonstrates how the law favored the landlord's in­
terest in the condition of his property over the tenant's right to live 
in a safe dwelling. The Fiorntino court held that the landlord had 
no duty to keep the premises safe at all times for the tenant. 93 A 
duty would exist only if the lessor expressly agreed to keep the 
premises not only in repair but also in a safe condition throughout 
the term. Such an agreement would place on the landlord the ad­
ditional duty to inspect and discover defects. 94 The court termed 
such an arrangement "a most onerous undertaking" for the land­
lord. 95 
Judicial reluctance to impose burdens on the suppliers of 
housing continued as the nation grew and modernized and the 
need for adequate housing became more acute. In dealing with the 
failure to repair rule, which had insulated landlords from tort liabil­
ity for damages caused by their failure to repair, Massachusetts 
drew a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. If the 
tenant could prove that the landlord committed a misfeasance by, 
for example, making repairs in fulfillment of an agreement and 
doing so in a negligent manner, tort redress was permitted under 
ordinary negligence principles. 96 The prevailing judicial attitude ef­
fectively discouraged landlords from honoring their repair agree­
ments since refusal to make repairs constituted nonfeasance and re­
sulted in liability only for the cost of repairs. The reason behind 
this distinction was that the lessor, by making repairs, though he 
did so negligently, led the lessee to believe that the condition had 
92. Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383. 
93. 233 Mass. at 456, 124 N.E. at 285. 
94. ld. at 454, 124 N.E. at 284. 
95. ld. at 453, 124 N.E. at 284. 
96. Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234, 238, 124 N.E. 13, 14 (1919). The court 
found that the landlord was not liable. The decision, however, in dicta, did reaffirm 
the rule that negligent repair of the balcony railing by the landlord constituted mis­
feasance and therefore entitled plaintiffs to recover under a tort theory of liability. 
See also Markarian v. Simonian, 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977) (reaffirming 
the misfeasance rule); DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 306 N.E.2d 
432 (1974) (landlord found liable in tort when negligent repairs to defective floor 
caused floor to collapse and injured plaintiff). 
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been corrected. Because the lessee was induced to believe that the 
premises were safe, he did not attempt to make repairs himself. 
Dangerous conditions, therefore, remained unrepaired. 97 Mas­
sachusetts courts also attached heavier liability to misfeasance be­
cause in many cases the negligent repairs not only failed to correct 
the defect but made the condition worse. 98 For these. reasons the 
courts felt that lessors who negligently made repairs were less de­
serving of protection from tort liability than lessors who simply did 
nothing. In addition, less overt reasons, such as the limited avail­
ability of liability insurance, explain the courts' reluctance in early 
tort decisions to impose liability on landlords and other business 
entrepreneurs. 99 
The 1974 decision of DiMarzo v. S.&P. Realty Corp.lOO opened 
the door to abolition of the common-law failure to repair rule. The 
DiMarzo court stated that the common-law rules would be recon­
sidered when the facts of a case warranted it. lOl Such an opportu­
97. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 408. See alsp Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 
477 (1870). 
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 411. 
99. In many early cases, the courts chose not to render decisions adverse to 
landlords in order to avoid decreasing landlords' capital investments. See Lossee v. 
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873), which stated: 
[Tlhe general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and 
possession of my real estate ... are much modified by the exigencies of the 
social state ... We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and rail­
roads .... I take the risk of being accidentally injured in my person without 
fault on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as person, in the 
social state, are not absolute but relative and they must be so arranged ... to 
promote the general welfare. 
Id. at 484. Another explanation for the attitude was that "American judges of the 
Nineteenth Century were of a different breed. Many were politicians; all were living 
in a new land crying for exploitation; industrialists were often dominant figures in 
society; country gentlemen were rarely judges in industrial states." Morris, Hazard­
ous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1175-76 (1952). See 
also James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 
YALE L.J. 549 (1948). 
Furthermore, liability insurance was not as common as it is today. See Tinker, 
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Perspective and Overview, 25 FED'N 
INS. COUNSEL 217, 220 (1975). Thus, the courts were reluctant to saddle those who 
provided rental housing with financial burdens that were often far in excess of what 
the typical landlord at that time could afford to pay. 
100. 364 Mass. 510, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974). Because the landlord negligently 
made repairs, liability was found on the basis of ordinary negligence principles. The 
tenant's employee was injured when he fell through a floor weakened by water dam­
age. The landlord, in an effort to repair, merely put in a few nails "here and there." 
Id. at 512, 306 N.E.2d at 433. 
101. Id. at 514, 306 N.E.2d at 434. 
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nity arose in Markarian v. Simonian l02 when a lessor was found li­
able for the negligent installation of window screens. In that case, 
a child was injured when he fell through a screen and out a 
window. loa The supreme judicial court, however, refused to over­
rule a 1937 case, Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 104 
which found no liability when a child fell through a screen and 
out a third-floor window. The Markarian decision distinguished 
Chelefou on the ground of foreseeability. The screens in Markarian 
were installed for the purpose of preventing a child from falling 
outl05 while the screens in Chelefou were installed to allow a 
breeze to cool the apartment while keeping insects out.106 Because 
of this distinction the court allowed the plaintiff in Markarian to 
recover while avoiding the need to overrule Chelefou. Thus, the 
Chelefou barrier to tort recovery, omission or nonfeasance, sur­
vived the Markarian decision. The court would go only so far as to 
cast doubt on the validity of Chelefou. 107 The timidity of the 
Markarian decision illustrates the way in which the Massachusetts 
judiciary sidestepped opportunities to aggressively attack the obso­
lete common-law rules. lOS Until 1973, when the modern trend 
began in Massachusetts,109 cases commonly were handled like 
Markarian: the court, in order to reach fair decisions while leaving 
antiquated rules intact, was continuously expending "considerable 
energy and [exercising] great ingenuity in attempting to fit various 
factual settings into recognized exceptions."l1O Markarian thus left 
a degree of uncertainty in its wake regarding the future existence 
of the common-law failure to repair rule in Massachusetts. 
Poirier v. Town of Plymouth111 hinted at an answer by abol­
ishing the "hidden defect" barrier to recovery.112 This barrier, 
102. 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 (1977). 
103. Id. at 672, 369 N.E.2d at 720. 
104. 297 Mass. at 236, 8 N.E.2d at 769. 
105. 373 Mass. at 675, 369 N.E.2d at 722. 
106. 297 Mass. at 236, 8 N.E.2d at 769. 
107. 373 Mass. at 675, 369 N.E.2d at 722. 
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Reporter's Note to Introductory 
Note, ch. 17, at 157 (1977). 
109. See note 150 infra and accompanying text. 

llO. See note 108 supra. 

llI. 374 Mass. 206, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978). The court set down a standard of 

reasonable care for an employer to adhere to in insuring that his property would be 
safe. 
ll2. See Note, Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, The Hidden Defect Rule, and New 
Patterns of Tort Law Reform in Massachusetts, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537 (1979). 
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commonly referred to as the hidden defect rule, had placed a 
heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs to show that their injuries were 
caused by a hidden defect on a landowner's property which the 
landlord knew about or should have discovered. 113 If the lessor 
failed to rebut the plaintiffs allegations by proving that the hidden 
defect was not readily discoverable, the lessee could recover. 114 
proof that the defect was not discoverable served as an affirmative 
defense for the landlord. 115 The Poirier court abolished the hidden 
defect rule and substituted a "standard of ordinary care under all 
circumstances. "116 
Although Poirier dealt with the relation between a landowner­
employer and his employee, one Massachusetts jurist has opined 
that the Poirier holding is readily applicable to landlord-tenant 
law. 117 Massachusetts Court of Appeals Justice John M. Greaney 
stated that the now obsolete distinction between patent and latent 
defects inherent in the hidden defects rule could be eliminated as 
a discredited "status" distinction, just as the status distinction be­
tween licensees and invitees has been abolished. In 1978, Mounsey 
v. Ellard118 held that the status distinction between invitees and li­
censees, which resulted in imposition of different standards of care 
on landlords, prevented juries from "ever determining the fun­
damental question whether the defendant has acted reasonably."119 
Because of this, the court found that such a status distinction was 
no longer valid. Justice Greaney reasoned from the Mounsey case 
that a standard of reasonable care should apply to a landlord as 
well as to a landowner-employer. He also predicted that the next 
appropriate case would be decided under the reasonable care stan­
dard. 120 
In 1980 the uncertainty created by Markarian and partially re­
solved by Poirier, as to !10W far the pro-tenant trend of Massa­
chusetts decisions would extend, was conclusively eliminated. The 
113. ld. at 540. 
114. ld. 
115. ld. 

U6. ld. at 539. 

117. Greaney, Developing Duties of a Landlord with Regard to Tenant Safety, 
63 MASS. L. REV. 61, 66 (1978). 
118. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). For a full explanation of the 
Mounsey rationale and the visitor status distinctions, see notes 156-67 infra and ac­
companying text. 
119. 363 Mass. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 44. 
120. Greaney, supra note 117, at 66. 
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the unprecedented case 
of Young v. Garwacki,121 held a landlord liable in tort for failing to 
repair a defective balcony railing. 122 The landlord was held liable 
for injuries sustained by Young, a third party visiting the building, 
as a result of her fall through a defective balcony railing. The land­
lord, La Freniere, had been on notice that the defect existed. No 
express agreement, however, bound the landlord to make re­
pairs. 123 The Young court held that the landlord had not used rea­
sonable care in maintaining the premises in a safe condition even 
though the landlord had not agreed to make repairs. Thus, an im­
plied agreement to repair the premises existed. 124 By finding such 
an implied agreement and by holding the landlord liable in tort for 
failing to make repairs, the misfeasance-nonfeasance element of the 
failure to repair rule was all but abolished. Prior to Young, a find­
ing of nonfeasance made a lessor liable only for the cost of repairs; 
the Young court, however, found the lessor liable in tort. Thus, 
common tort damages encompassing such things as medical ex­
penses, lost wages, and pain and suffering were available. The 
decision went on to abolish the "control" distinction which previ­
ously had barred recovery. 125 The control distinction provided that 
a landlord had no duty to repair those parts of the premises under 
the tenant's control. The areas of rental property not demised ex­
clusively to a tenant were considered the only areas that the lessor 
was responsible for repairing, if in fact a duty to repair existed at 
all. In Young the defective railing was part of the premises de­
mised to the tenant and therefore was under the tenant's con­
trol. 126 Finding the landlord liable for failing to repair this railing 
effectively abolished the control distinction as a potential bar to 
tort redress. 
A weak argument could be made that Young did not abolish 
the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction within the failure to repair 
rule in light of the fact that the rule's requirement of an express 
121. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729,402 N.E.2d 1045. 
122. ld. 
123. The landlord, however, testified that he considered it his obligation to re­
pair the railing. ld. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046. The tenant, Garwacki, had been 
found liable for the plaintiff Young's injuries in a previous suit. The tenant, however, 
had not appealed the decision nor had he sought indemnification from his landlord. 
124. For a full discussion of Young, see notes 134-41 infra and accompanying 
text. 
125. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049. 
126. ld. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046. 
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agreement to repair had not been met. No express agreement 
to repair existed in Young. Although past decisions, such as 
Markarian,127 had relied on questionable distinctions in order to 
avoid overruling prior cases, the distinction between express and 
implied agreements cannot be used to limit a tenant's tort recov­
ery. The Young court held that a duty to repair exists regardless of 
the presence of an express agreement to repair. Therefore, no dis­
tinction can be drawn between express and implied agreements. 
The legal consequences of a landlord's breach of his duty should 
not depend on the presence or absence of an express agreement to 
repair. In Yanofsky, however, an express agreement to repair the 
roof did exist. The landlord, after receiving notice and reasonable 
time to repair, failed to make such repairs and was held liable in 
tort. The Yanofsky and Young decisions thus put an end to the 
continuing validity, however eroded, of decisions such as Chelefou 
and Fiorntino which supported the validity of the nonfeasance bar 
to tort recovery inherent in the failure to repair rule. The supreme 
judicial court, in imposing increased responsibility on the party 
best able to prevent the injury, continued the trend toward recog­
nition and enforcement of tenants' rights. The court accomplished 
this by allowing an action in tort against the landlord when he was 
alleged to be guilty of nonfeasance, contrary to the old common­
law rule. 
V. YOUNG AND ABOLITION OF THE RULE THAT 

No AGREEMENT TO REPAIR WILL BE IMPLIED BY 

A MERE LEASING OF PREMISES 

Another rule strictly adhered to at common law was that no 
agreement to repair would be implied by a mere leasing of prem­
ises. 128 The absence of an agreement to repair was a bar to recov­
ery in all but one situation. When a landlord gratuitously made re­
pairs, the Massachusetts courts allowed an injured plaintiff to 
recover in tort if gross negligence could be proven. 129 The rule was 
reaffirmed in 1972 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Popowych v. PoorvU. 130 The decision reiterated the principle that, 
in the absence of an agreement to repair, the lessors were under 
127. 373 Mass. at 669, 369 N.E.2d at 718. See notes 102-10 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
128. Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 124 N.E. 74 (1919). 
129. Id. at 398, 124 N.E. at 84. 
130. 361 Mass. 848, 279 N.E.2d 705 (1972). 
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no affirmative duty to make repairs to a window. If they chose to 
do so gratuitously, they would be liable for injury only if the plain­
tiff could prove gross negligence on the part of the repairmen hired 
by the lessor.131 During trial it was revealed that the lessor's re­
pairmen had left debris on the floor after they began to fix the 
window. Plaintiff, Popowych, a third party, fell on a round, hard 
object. 132 Since the repairmen's actions did not constitute gross 
negligence, plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering. 133 
In Young v. Garwacki 134 plaintiff, who was injured by falling 
through a defective balcony railing, alleged two counts of negli­
gence. The trial court judge, while noting that the accident 
occurred on a part of the premises demised to the tenant and sup­
posedly under his control, rejected the control distinction. The 
jury was instructed "to assume that there was an implied duty 
imposed on the landlord to exercise reasonable care to maintain 
the rental premises in a reasonably safe condition. "135 In affirming 
the lower court's decision, the supreme judicial court commended 
the trial judge for his foresight in giving such an instruction in view 
of the fact that prior to Young redress was not allowed for injuries 
incurred as a result of defects in parts of the premises under the 
tenant's control. 136 
Young found that a duty to repair was implicit in the leasing of 
the premises even without an express agreement to repair. By 
finding the landlord liable for injuries resulting from his failure to 
repair when no express agreement to repair existed, the Massa­
chusetts judiciary, for the first time, found such an agreement to 
be implied from the leasing arrangement. The court went even fur­
ther by including within the lessor's duty to repair the requirement 
that he use reasonable care to insure that the parts of the premises 
demised to the tenant, and under the tenant's control, be main­
tained in a safe condition. Distinctions such as control, based on 
outdated rules, were said to do nothing more than discourage re­
pairs on rented premises since landlords under that principle had 
no incentive to repair and tenants with short-term leases often 
lacked the desire, knowledge, and resources to do SO.137 The 
131. [d. at 849, 279 N.E.2d at 706. See also text accompanying note 8 supra. 
132. 361 Mass. at 848, 279 N.E.2d at 706. 
133. [d. at 848-49, 279 N.E.2d at 706. 
134. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045. 
135. [d. at 731 n.1, 402 N.E.2d at 1046 n.1 (emphasis added). 
136. [d. 
137. [d. at 735, 402 N.E.2d at 1049. 
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Young court hoped to encourage necessary repairs and thus to 
eliminate potential traps to unwary third parties such as Ms. 
Young. 138 The Young decision signifies a new standard for lessors: 
their conduct is to be measured under all circumstances by a 
standard of reasonableness rather than by archaic common-law 
rules and doctrines. 139 
The extent to which landlords are chargeable with knowledge 
was not determined in Young. 140 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Justice Liacos, however, made it clear that a landlord "should 
not be liable in negligence unless he knew or reasonably should 
have known of the defect and had a reasonable opportunity to re­
pair it. "141 Young, which focused on residential leases, left the 
following questions open with regard to commercial leases:142 
Whether an agreement to repair will be implied in a commercial, 
as opposed to a residential, lease arrangement; whether the control 
distinction will maintain its validity in a commercial setting; and, 
taking the possibilities to the extreme, whether a landlord may be 
held liable to a commercial tenant for injuries sustained as a result 
of defects on parts of the rental premises within the tenant's con­
trol in the absence of an express agreement to repair. These issues 
will be discussed in the context of the Yanofsky decision. 
The facts of the Yanofsky case did not permit the court to de­
cide these questions since Yanofsky involved a defect in an area 
which the landlord had expressly agreed to repair.143 Yanofsky, in 
implying an agreement to indemnify from an express agreement to 
repair, extended complete financial protection to tenants who oth­
erwise would be liable to third persons injured as a result of unsafe 
138. Id. at 735-36, 402 N.E.2d at 1049. 
139. Seven years ago, in Sa .. gent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-398, 308 A.2d 
528, 534 (1973), Chief Justice Kenison wrote: "Henceforth, landlords as 
other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an un­
reasonable risk of harm. A landlord must act as a reasonable person under 
all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the 
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or 
avoiding the risk. We think this basic principle of responsibility for land­
lords as for others 'best expresses the principles of justice and reasonable­
ness upon which our law of torts is founded' (citations omitted). Henceforth, 
this basic principle of responsibility applies to Massachusetts landlords as 
well. 
Id. at 736, 402 N.E.2d at 1049. 
140. Id. at 737 n.8, 402 N.E.2d at 1050 n.8. 
141. Id. at 737, 402 N.E.2d at 1050. 
142. "We do not decide whether our rule today should extend to nonresidential 
properties." Id. at 738 n.12, 402 N.E.2d at 1051 n.12. 
143. See text accompanying note 48 supra. 
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conditions on premises which the landlord expressly agreed to re­
pair. 144 This note will examine several issues raised when 
Yanofsky's implications are considered: Whether an agreement to 
indemnifY will be implied from an express agreement to make re­
pairs in a residential leasehold situation;145 whether an indemnifi­
cation agreement will be implied in a residential context in the ab­
sence of an express agreement to repair;146 whether an agreement 
to repair will be implied in a commercial lease;147 and whether an 
agreement to indemnify will be implied in a commercial leasehold 
setting where no express agreement to repair exists. 148 Only by ex­
amining the current trend in Massachusetts regarding landlord- . 
tenant tort law can one attempt to forecast the answers to these 
questions. 
VI. 	 OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
LANDLORD-TENANT LAw PRIOR TO YANOFSKY 
The year 1973 was critical in Massachusetts landlord-tenant 
law. By implying a warranty of· habitability149 in all residential 
leases, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Boston Hous­
ing Authority v. Hemingway, 150 recognized that modern residential 
tenants are entitled to safe and humane living conditions. The 
Hemingway court extended the Ingalls v. Hobbs 151 holding, 
which implied the warranty only to furnished dwellings, by making 
the warranty applicable to all premises used primarily as dwell­
ings. 152 In addition, Hemingway abolished the rule that a tenant's 
covenant to pay rent was independent of the landlord's obligation 
to provide the premises. 153 The independent covenants rule was 
deemed obsolete since it was premised on the outdated idea that a 
lease was a conveyance of property.l54 In so holding, another of 
144. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374. 
145. See text accompanying notes 172-79 infra. 
146. See text accompanying notes 180-91 infra. 
147. See text accompanying notes 194-209 infra. 
148. See text accompanying notes 194-213 infra. 
149. Formerly, a warranty of habitability was implied only when a building 
was rented for the purpose of serving as a dwelling to the lessee. The warrranty of 
habitability serves as a guarantee that the premises are in a habitable condition and 
fit for use and occupation. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). 
150. 363 Mass. at 184,293 N.E.2d at 831. 
151. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). See the discussion of Ingalls in note 83 
supra. 
152. 363 \1ass. at 196-97,293 N.E.2d at 841. 
153. Id. at 198,293 N.E.2d 842. 
154. Id. See also note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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the tenant's common-law burdens fell. Caveat emptor155 was again 
seen as inconsistent with contemporary societal needs. 
Mounsey v. Ellard156 was also decided in 1973. In that case a 
police officer who slipped and was injured on defendant landown­
er's property was allowed to recover on a negligence theory. 157 
Prior to Mounsey, firemen and police officers were considered to 
be licensees, a subcategory of the common-law visitor class. 15s A li­
censee is someone who enters upon another's land with the occupi­
er's consent for his own purposes and not for the owner's bene­
fit. 159 An invitee, on the other hand, is one who enters the occu­
pier's premises at the occupier's invitation to conduct business 
which concerns the occupier. 160 The invitee is "placed on a higher 
footing than a licensee."161 To be included in this more protected 
category, a visitor had to confer a benefit upon the occupier in the 
performance of something in which the latter had an interest, pro­
vided the benefit was other than "'those intangible advantages 
arising from mere social intercourse.' "162 Before Mounsey, a licen­
see had to prove reckless or willful and wanton conduct in order to 
recover.163 The court, in refusing to further honor the licensee 
versus invitee status distinction and in adopting one duty of reason­
able care for all landowners and occupiers, removed another bur­
den from the shoulders of injured plaintiffs. The Massachusetts Su­
preme Judicial Court, in the words of Chief Justice Tauro, refused 
to follow the "ancient and largely discredited common law distinc­
tion" between invitees and licensees because the "status question 
often prevents the jury from ever determining the fundamental 
question whether the defendant has acted reasonably in light of all 
the circumstances in the particular case."164 Although Mounsey 
dealt with a landowner-defendant, the court expressly applied its 
holding to land occupiers as well. 165 The Mounsey decision ex­
155. For a discussion of caveat emptor, see text accompanying notes 63 & 64 
supra. 
156. 363 Mass. at 693, 297 N.E.2d at 43. 
157. ld. 
158. ld. at 694-95, 297 N.E.2d at 44. 
159. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 376. 
160. ld. at 385. 

16l. ld. 

162. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. at 705, 297 N.E.2d at 50 (quoting Taylor v. 
Goldstein, 329 Mass. 161, 165, 107 N.E.2d 14, 16 (1952)). 
163. ld. at 694,297 N.E.2d at 44. 
164. ld. at 706-07, 297 N.E.2d at 51 (footnote omitted). 
165. ld. 
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pressly abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees 
and imposed a single duty of reasonable care on all land­
owners and occupiers with regard to anyone legally on their prem­
ises. 166 This rule parallels the intent of chapter 186, section 19 of 
the Massachusetts General Laws:167 a lessor must exercise reason­
able care to correct unsafe conditions on rental property. 
The reasonableness standard, espoused in Mounsey, carried 
through much of the subsequent Massachusetts case law dealing 
with the landlord's duty to maintain leased premises in a safe con­
dition. Prior to Mounsey, Hemingway effectively extinguished the 
validity of the common-law view of a lease as a conveyance of an 
interest in land by holding that landlords have a duty to provide 
tenants with habitable dwellings. By accepting the modern view, 
that a lease is essentially a contractual exchange of covenants, 
Hemingway lent support to the Mounsey rationale that the crucial 
question when tort issues arise in the landlord-tenant context is the 
reasonableness of the landlord's conduct. These two decisions were 
the first in a line of cases that radically changed the obligations of 
landlords. 
Four years later the supreme judicial court extended the rea­
sonableness standard of Mounsey. Two decisions eliminated yet an­
other common-law bar to recovery. In King v. G & M Realty 
COrp.,168 a tenant's guest was allowed tort redress upon proving 
that the stairway where her accident occurred had been negligently 
maintained. In a similar case, Lindsey v. Massios,169 the court al­
lowed a tenant who was injured on an unlit stairway to recover. 
These decisions imposed a reasonableness standard on the landlord 
regardless of who was injured as long as it was foreseeable that the 
victim would be on the premises. The landlord's defense in relying 
on the status distinction between a tenant and a tenant's guest was 
readily defeated by application of the Mounsey rationale. Extension 
of the Mounsey reasonableness standard to abolish the distinction 
between tenant and guest, a development which allowed both the 
166. Id. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. The court did, however, assert that a lesser 
duty existed with regard to trespassers. ld. at 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7. See also 
Kermatec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (citing Mounsey v. 
Ellard, 363 Mass. at 703-04, 708, 297 N.E.2d at 49, 52). The Court in Kermarec re­
fused to recognize the licensee-invitee distinction in maritime law. 
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). See note 45 supra and 
accompanying text. 
168. 373 Mass. 658,370 N.E.2d 413 (1977). 
169. 372 Mass. 79,360 N.E.2d 631 (1977). 
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King and Lindsey plaintiffs to recover, signifies the court's growing 
acceptance of the policies which demand the imposition of a 
greater standard of care on landlords. 170 With Hemingway's attack 
on caveat emptor, Mounsey's abolition of the common-law licensee­
invitee status distinction, and the extension of Mounsey in King 
and Lindsey to abolish the tenant-guest distinction, the Mas­
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clearly sounded the warning: ca­
veat lessor, or lessor beware. The Commonwealth had begun to 
align itself with the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions. 171 The 
Yanofsky ruling, allowing indemnification of a lessee by a lessor in 
a commercial lease, exemplifies the modem Massachusetts view of 
the landlord-tenant relationship. It is characteristic of the trend 
which began in 1973. 
VII. 	 AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN RESIDENTIAL 
LEASES CONTAINING EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO REPAIR 
The initial question left open by Yanofsky is whether an agree­
ment to indemnifY will be implied from an express agreement to 
repair in a residential leasehold relationship. This question must be 
answered affirmatively. In Yanofsky, the supreme judicial court 
adopted the reasoning of the Restatement (Second) of Property. 172 
The court's decision to hold the landlord liable was based on a 
number of persuasive factors set forth in the Restatement: The land­
lord contractually undertook to make repairs; the tenant justifiably 
relied on the landlord to make the repairs, thereby foregoing such 
efforts himself; and the landlord had a reversionary interest in the 
premises, providing him with incentive to keep his property in re­
pair. 173 The Restatement sections reli~d on in Yanofsky, however, 
do not mention indemnification. 
170. See text accompanying notes 150-69 supra; text accompanying note 171 
infra. 
171. See note 79 supra. See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 
N.E.2d 208 (1972), an Illinois case abolishing the independent covenants rule, in 
which the court used Justice Cardozo's definition of the judiciary's obligations re­
garding obsolete common law rules: "A rule which in its origin was the creation of 
the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the 
day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation 
of the rule would do violence to the social conscience." ld. at 367, 280 N.E.2d at 217 
(quoting B. CARDOZO, THE GROWfH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924» (emphasis in origi­
nal). 
172. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 903, 403 N.E.2d at 374; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF PROPERTY §§ 17.4, 17.5 (1977). 
173. ld. § 17.5, comment b (1)-(3). 
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Forcing a landlord to pay for his breach of an express agree­
ment to repair also is supported by recent case law. It is widely ac­
cepted that, although modem residential tenants justifiably expect 
their apartments to be safe and habitable, most lack the knowl­
edge, financial resources, incentive, and ability to make repairs 
themselves. 174 In addition, the residential landlord is usually in the 
best position to distribute the cost of compensating injured plain­
tiffs.175 The Yanofsky court felt that the justifications for holding a 
landlord liable for physical harm caused by a breach of his express 
agreement to repair also should protect innocent tenants from hav­
ing to bear the cost of such compensation. Implying an agreement 
to indemnify is firmly supported by notions of fairness as well as by 
the Restatement's rationale for holding the landlord liable when he 
has breached his express agreement to repair. The Restatement's 
reasoning is equally, if not more, applicable to situations involving 
residential leases. 
Residential tenants have even less opportunity and incentive 
to make repairs than commercial tenants. 176 A tenant who leases 
defective premises is often in possession for a short term, usually 
has little money, and probably does not know how to make re­
pairs. 177 Neither the Restatement nor tort principles draw a dis­
tinction between commercial and residential leases. The Young de­
cision, by implying an agreement to repair from a residential lease, 
placed increased responsibility on landlords who lease residential 
property.178 The Mounsey decision and chapter 186, section 19 of 
the Massachusetts General Laws impose a duty of reasonable care 
on landlords to ensure the safety of their property.179 These hold­
ings, in conjunction with the social policies which inspired the 
post-1973 movement to make tort recovery more available to ten­
174. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383. 
175. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 494. See also Pound, The End of Law as 
Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195,233 (1914); note 189 
infra. 
176. See generally Quinn & Phillips, supra note 53, at 225. See also RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, Comment a (1965); text accompanying notes 73-76 
supra. 
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, Comment a (1965); text ac­
companying notes 73-76 supra. 
178. See text accompanying notes 121-25 supra. 
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). For the text of this stat­
ute, see note 45 supra. 
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ants, appear to encourage extension of Yanofsky to residential 
leaseholds involving express agreements to repair. 
In Yanofsky the supreme judicial court found that the landlord 
breached his duty to repair. This breach was found to be the 
foreseeable cause of a victim's injury. Inherent in the decision to 
imply an agreement to indemnify is the notion that when a land­
lord causes an injury, he alone should be responsible for com­
pensating the victim. This reasoning should be equally applicable 
to residential tenants in order to protect them from financial loss. 
VIII. AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED IN A RESIDENTIAL 

LEASE WITH AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO REPAIR 

A somewhat more difficult question is presented when the 
agreement to repair is implied rather than expressed in a residen­
tial lease. The Young decision, in applying a reasonableness 
standard, held that a landlord's duty to repair is implicit in the 
mere leasing of residential property.180 The court also abolished 
the control distinction as a bar to recovery .181 Thus, in a residen­
tial context, it does not matter whether the defect was located in a 
leased or common area as long as the landlord had notice of the 
defect and had time to repair it. It appears, therefore, that the su­
preme judicial court will find a duty to repair whether expressed or 
implied in all residential leases. Whether an implied agreement to 
indemnify a tenant for money paid to third parties in settlement of 
injury claims can be derived from an implied agreement to repair 
is another question. 
On its face, language appearing in the Yanofsky opinion might 
discourage extension of indemnification in the context of implied 
agreements to repair. Justice Quirico stated: "such an agreement 
to indemnify may be implied as a matter of law from an agreement 
to repair, contained in the express terms of a lease. "182 Since 
Yanofsky involved a commercial lease containing an express agree­
ment to repair, Justice Quirico dealt specifically with express 
agreements. Even though the Yanofsky decision focused on express 
agreements, the logical extension of the principles espoused in re­
cent Massachusetts cases indicates that an agreement to indemnify 
180. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 730, 402 N.E.2d at 1046. 
181. [d. Abolition of the control distinction is discussed in text accompanying 
notes 125 & 126 supra. 
182. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 905, 403 N.E.2d at 375 (emphasis added). 
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will be implied when a duty to repair has been found in the ab­
sence of an express agreement. 
Analysis of the Young and Yanofsky decisions' treatment of the 
Restatement supports indemnification. The comments accompa­
nying section 17.5 of the Restatement state that the rule holding a 
landlord liable in tort for failing to honor his contractual promise to 
repair applies only to express agreements to repair. 183 Young 
clearly rejected the requirement that an express agreement to re­
pair must exist in order for an injured victim to recover in tort 
against a landlord. It necessarily follows that the supreme judicial 
court found the Restatement requirement of an express agreement 
to be obsolete. The supreme judicial court in Yanofsky, therefore, 
in relying on the Restatement rationale to imply an agreement to 
indemnify, could not have been referring to the Restatement's 
discussion of express agreements in the lease but rather to the Re­
statement's reasoning that the party causing the plaintiff's injuries 
should bear the cost of compensation. When the breach of a duty 
to repair causes the plaintiff's injuries, whether the duty arose 
from an express or an implied agreement should be irrelevant. If 
the supreme judicial court is to remain consistent with the policies 
developed since 1973 in Massachusetts and with its adoption of the 
Restatement rationale in Yanofsky, as modified by the Young deci­
sion, the court will have to allow an agreement to indemnify to be 
implied in a residential lease regardless of the existence of an ex­
press agreement to make repairs. It is clear that the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has extended its protection of tenants and 
their guests far beyond the Restatement's rules. 
Requiring an express agreement to repair as a prerequisite to 
indemnification may make sense in a commercial relationship, 184 
but a different result is clearly warranted in a residential context. 
The policies behind protection of innocent tenants and third par­
ties, now widely recognized by the courts, encourage indemnifica­
tion for both economic and physical harm. 185 The supreme judicial 
court has frequently reached decisions consistent with these poli­
cies. 18S The Yanofsky decision focused on the fact that the landlord 
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.5, comment b(l) (1977). 
184. An analysis of the distinction between commercial and residential leases 
appears in text accompanying notes 196-208 infra. 
185. These policies are discussed in text accompanying notes 150-71 supra. 
186. Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045; 
Crowell v. McCaffrey, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 568, 386 N.E.2d 1256; Lindsey v. 
Massios,372 Mass. 79,360 N.E.2d 631 (1977); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. at 693, 
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caused Mrs. Vahey's injuries by breaching his duty to repair. He 
alone, therefore, was held responsible for bearing the cost of 
compensating her.187 A landlord has no less a duty to make repairs 
when the agreement to repair is implied rather than expressed. 
The law is concerned with protecting innocent tenants and guests. 
The supreme judicial court stated that; 
it [is] clear, moreover, that a lessee such as A & P that is "in­
jured" by virtue of being reasonably obliged to settle a claim for 
personal injuries which were caused by the lessor's failure to re­
pair an unsafe condition within a reasonable time, would have a 
cause of action against the lessor under the statute to recover 
such amounts reasonably paid. ISS 
In insulating the innocent tenant from economic harm by forcing 
the negligent landlord to indemnifY him, financial responsibility for 
injuries suffered as a result of unsafe rental premises is placed 
upon the lessor. Liability, as espoused in modem tort theory, 
should rest on the "party best able to bear [the risk], and most 
likely to prevent the injuries. "189 The availability of liability insur­
ance, the landlord's stronger bargaining position, and his greater 
ability to spread the costs of compensation all indicate that he is in 
the best position to pay damages incurred as a result of the breach 
of his duty to repair. 
The Young decision's dismissal of the distinction between im­
plied and express agreements to repair, as they impact upon the 
landlord's liability, should be sufficient to prevent a hindlord from 
297 N.E.2d at 43; Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 184,293 N.E.2d 
at 831. 
187. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902, 403 N.E.2d at 374. 
188. Id. (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977) to insu­
late tenants from economic harm caused by the landlord's breach of his duty to re­
pair) (emphasis added). 
189. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 410. See also Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 
Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 
MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (1958). Professor Cooperrider's reaction to F. HARPER & 
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) was that the basic principles oftort law "can be 
summarized in two slogans, 'Let All Victims Be Compensated,' and 'Let the Loss Be 
Spread: .. See also Pound, supra note 175, at 233. 
W. PROSSER, supra note 79, supports Cooperrider's proposition: 

There is 'a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on neither 

side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the 

loss and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where there has been no 

fault: An entire field of legislation, illustrated by the workmen's compensa­

tion acts, has been based upon the same principle. 

Id. at 494. 
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using lack of an express agreement to repair as a bar to a tenant's 
action for indemnification. Failure to remove this potential bar to 
recovery would be tantamount to finding the landlord at fault and 
responsible for a third party's injuries while holding the tenant lia­
ble for compensating the victim merely because the agreement to 
repair was implied rather than express. The Young court abolished 
the distinction in the repair context; to revive it in the indemnifica­
tion context would be inconsistent and indefensible. If a duty to re­
pair exists, then the reasons for allowing indemnification of the ten­
ant also exist. Whether the landlord's duty was implied or express 
should not be relevant. 
Little resistance to imposing increased responsibility onto 
landlords remains in Massachusetts. Stricter standards have been 
applied to landlords' actions as the ancient common-law rules have 
been rejected. 190 The stage has been set for realization of the logi­
cal and reasonable consequences of the Yanofsky decision. An 
agreement to indemnifY must be implied from any agreement, ex­
press or implied, to make repairs. Such a result would further the 
important social policy of compensating innocent victims quickly 
and efficiently by placing the burden of compensation on the party 
who is responsible for the hazard, who can best prevent such acci­
dents, and who can best distribute the cost. 191 
IX. AGREEMENT TO REPAIR IMPLIED IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE 
Whether an agreement to repair will be implied in a commer­
cial lease will be determined by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court's view as to the validity of the distinctions often drawn 
between commercial and residential leases. The court in Young, 
relying on both the legislative intent underlying chapter 186, sec­
tion 19 of the Massachusetts General Laws192 and the recent trend 
of decisions in Massachusetts, implied an agreement to repair in a 
residential lease. 193 The court did not decide whether the holding 
applied to nonresidential property.194 Extension to commercial 
premises, however, was not expressly precluded. 
190. See text accompanying notes 149-71 supra for a discussion of the demise 
of these common-law rules in Massachusetts. 
191. See W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 494; Cooperrider, supra note 189, at 
1299. 
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). 
193. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729,402 N.E.2d 1045. The Young holding is dis­
cussed in text accompanying notes 121-25 supra. 
194. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 738 n.12, 402 N.E.2d at 1051 n.12. 
381 1980] LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 
The two kinds of leases frequently are distinguished on the ba­
sis of the compelling needs of residential tenants. The view of a 
"dwelling as a necessity of life" and the social consequences of 
poor housing have led courts to provide greater protection to resi­
dential tenants. 195 These factors are not present when a building is 
leased for commercial reasons. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and the Restatement (Second) of Property, however, have been in­
terpreted as making no distinction between residential and com­
mercial leases. 196 As new rules regarding landlord-tenant tort law 
are adopted, the various policy considerations relevant to commer­
cial and residential leases will continue to be debated. 197 
Before 1959, the Massachusetts judiciary gave little indication 
about its stance on the distinction to be made between residential 
and commercial leases. In 1959, however, the supreme judicial 
court, for the first time, allowed a commercial tenant to recover for 
damages arising from the landlord's failure to maintain and repair 
the premises. 198 This decision was reached at a time when dam­
ages allowable for such a "nonfeasance" breach were limited to the 
cost of repairs. The liberal damages award, coupled with the recent 
trend of decisions in Massachusetts, indicates judicial concern for 
the protection of commercial tenants. 
An analysis of the recent enactments of the Massachusetts leg­
islature lends support to the contention that a distinction between 
residential and commercial leases is unwarranted. In 1972, the 
Massachusetts legislature enacted chapter 186, sections 19199 and 
195. See Note, Commercial Versus Residential Leases: A New Double 
Standard?, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 901, 907 (1974). See also Berzito v. Gambino, 119 N.J. 
Super. 332, 291 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1972). 
196. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 312, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1977). 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.2, 5.4 (Landlord & Tenant 
Discussion Draft, 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965). 
197. Whether judges presume that landlords are generally in a superior bar­
gaining position is a matter of considerable debate. For decisions supporting the 
view that commercial tenants maintain a stronger bargaining position than residential 
tenants, see Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, III Cal. Rptr. 
704 (1974); Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. The Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. 1973); 
Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975); Midland Carpet Corp. v. 
Franklin Assoc. Properties, 90 N.J. Super. 42, 216 A.2d 231 (App. Div. 1966); Gabl v. 
Alaska Loan & Inv. Co., 6 Wash. App. 880, 496 P.2d 548 (1972). Contra, Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30 (1977); College Mobile Home Park & 
Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976). 
198. See Note, supra note 195, at 905-06 (discussing Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. 
Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959)). 
199. For the text of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977), see note 
45 supra. 
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15. 200 Section 19 deals with the landlord's duty to exercise reason­
able care in repairing defects. Section 15 prevents the landlord 
from exculpating himself from liability. The legislature drew no dis­
tinction between residential and commercial landlords in either 
section. In section 19 the legislature speCifically carved out an ex­
ception for owner-occupied, two- or three-family dwellings201 yet 
was silent as to commercial property. Had the legislature intended 
to limit section 19 to residential leases, it would have done so with 
clear language to that effect, as it had done regarding lessors of 
two- or three-family dwellings. 202 The same argument is applicable 
to the language in chapter 186, section 15, which speaks of leases 
only as they relate to "real property."203 That language does not 
distinguish between residential and commercial landlords either. 
The language chosen by the legislature, therefore, can be inter­
preted to impose a reasonableness standard on commercial as well 
as residential landlords. 
A reason often given for a legal distinction between residential 
and commercial landlords is that commercial tenants maintain a 
stronger bargaining position than residential tenants. 204 The ab­
sence of an agreement to repair might imply that the parties, in 
negotiating the lease, for whatever reason, decided not to include 
an agreement by the landlord to repair. This freedom of contract 
argument can be explored only with an understanding of the pur­
poses of liability. The law is concerned with injuries to unsus­
pecting third parties as well as to tenants. The courts, in order to 
200. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15 (West 1977) states that: 
Any provision of a lease or other rental agreement relating to real prop­
erty whereby a lessee or tenant enters into a covenant, agreement or con­
tract, by the use of any words whatsoever, the effect of which is to indem­
nify the lessor or landlord or hold the lessor or landlord harmless, or 
preclude or exonerate the lessor or landlord from any or all liability to the 
lessee or tenant, or to any other person, for any injury, loss, damage or liabil­
ity arising from any omission, fault, negligence or other misconduct of the 
lessor or landlord on or about the leased or rented premises or on or about 
any elevators, stairways, hallways or other appurtenance used in connection 
therewith, shall be deemed to be against public policy and void. 
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 19 (West 1977). See note 45 supra for 
the full text of the statute. 
202. The Michigan Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 
312, 258 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1977), makes a similar argument, citing the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965), which also recognizes no distinction between resi­
dential and commercial leases with regard to the landlord-tenant relationship. 
203. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15 (West 1977). For the full text of § 15, 
see note 200 supra. 
204. See note 197 supra. 
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protect these parties, will continue to attach liability to those who 
are responsible for the defective conditions causing injury and who 
are in the best position to make repairs. 205 This principle of deter­
rence is deeply ingrained in judicial thought. Even when many of 
the now defunct common-law rules still were followed, an excep­
tion to the rule exempting landlords from liability existed when the 
property was leased for a purpose requiring admission of the pub­
lic. Basically, the exception was founded on the idea that a land­
lord's duty to the public was so great that shifting liability to the 
tenant in certain situations was forbidden. 206 A second exception 
prevented landlords from using their property in such a way as to 
create a public nuisance. 207 This second exception applied only to 
conditions existing prior to possession by the commercial tenant, 208 
yet it embodied the policy of expanding a landlord's duty to repair 
leased property when the public was to be admitted. 
The freedom of contract argument, often used to support a ju­
dicial hands-off policy regarding commercial leases, was dealt a se­
vere blow by Yanofsky. It is clear that the tenant, A & P, was in at 
least an equal bargaining position with the lessor. 209 The lease, 
while expressing an agreement to repair, conspicuously omitted an 
agreement to indemnifY. The traditional freedom of contract ratio­
nale would suggest that the absence of such an agreement was in­
tended by the parties, who surely must have known of the exis­
tence of such a device. Regardless of the existence of equal bar­
gaining positions, the supreme judicial court felt it necessary to ex­
tend complete financial protection to the commercial tenant by 
implying an agreement to indemnifY. The Yanofsky decision repre­
sents the latest step in the trend of decisions emphasizing tenants' 
rights, regardless of the commercial or residential nature of the 
lease. The demise of the commercial versus residential distinction 
is even clearer when chapter 186, section 19 is construed to mean 
that commercial as well as residential landlords should be held to a 
reasonable standard of care, regardless of the existence of an ex­
205. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also Harkrider, supra note 78, at 383. 
206. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 403-04. 
207. ld. at 404. 
208. ld. at 405. 
209. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Corp. reported $24.2 million income 
before taxes, $13.8 million net income, $667.1 million total current assets, $423.8 
million total current liabilities, and $243.3 million net working capital as of February 
26, 1977. [1980] 3 Moody's Investors Service, No. 62, § 24 (Aug. 4, 1980). 
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press agreement to make repairs. The supreme judicial court, in 
Yotlng, decided that such an express agreement was unnecessary in 
a residential lease. Implying an agreement to repair in a commer­
cial lease would be consistent with prior case law, legislative in­
tent, and social policy. 
X. AGREEMENT TO INDEMNIFY IMPLIED FROM 

AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO REPAIR IN A COMMERCIAL LEASE 

Assuming that an agreement to repair may be implied in a 
commercial lease, it is necessary to consider whether an agreement 
to indemnify may be implied as well. The same policies favoring an 
implied agreement to repair support implying an agreement to in­
demnify, even absent an express agreement to repair. Should the 
court imply a duty to repair, the manner in which the duty arises 
should be irrelevant. 21o Extension of the duty to repair would be 
the logical result if the Massachusetts judiciary were to continue 
applying social policies as it has in its recent decisions. 211 Deciding 
that the commercial landlord has a duty to repair, regardless of the 
existence of an express agreement to that effect, would be consist­
ent with the legislature's intent as well as with the court's commit­
ment to protecting tenants and unwary third parties. 212 The deci­
sion would reaffirm this commitment by placing the responsibility 
for physical injuries caused by unsafe conditions existing on any 
rented property upon the landlord who, when given notice and 
time to repair, unreasonably refused to do so. 
The arguments put forth in Yanofsky for implying an agree­
ment to indemnify would be equally applicable even in the ab­
sence of an express agreement to repair. 213 The major obstacle for 
the courts to overcome will be implying an agreement to repair in 
a commercial setting. If such an agreement is found, the duty to 
repair should carry with it a duty to indemnify in the event of a 
landlord's breach. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to find­
ing the landlord at fault for failing to prevent the injury while 
placing the burden of compensation on the tenant. 
210. This theory is discussed in detail in text accompanying notes 189-91 
supra. 
21l. These decisions are discussed in text accompanying notes 149-71 supra. 
212. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, §§ 15, 19 (West 1977). For the text of 
§ 15, see note 200 supra; for the text of § 19, see note 45 supra. 
213. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 902-05, 403 N.E.2d at 373-75. These arguments are 
discussed in text accompanying notes 180-91 supra. The Yanofsky decision made no 
reference to a distinction between commercial and residential leases. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
In the past, disputes between landlords and tenants were re­
solved by reference to the widely recognized view that a lease was 
a conveyance of a property interest. The tenant was perceived to 
have as much control over the property as he would if he owned it. 
Thus, the tenant bore the responsibility for making all necessary 
repairs. The failure to repair rule and the accompanying distinction 
between nonfeasance and misfeasance arose from this view. In al­
most all situations the law served as a bar to tenants' tort actions 
against landlords. 
The Massachusetts judiciary shared this view for many years. 
In 1973, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court aban­
doned its adherence to the principle that a lease is the equivalent 
of a conveyance of property. Since 1973 the court has adopted the 
position that a lease is a contractual exchange of covenants with ac­
companying duties. The trend of decisions in Massachusetts since 
1973 has been toward elimination of many barriers to tort recovery 
by tenants. The supreme judicial court has shown an unwavering 
commitment to holding landlords liable for tortious injuries 
incurred as a result of unsafe conditions on premises that the land­
lord had a duty to repair. 
This commitment was demonstrated further in Young v. 
Ganvacki. 214 In Young the supreme judicial court held a landlord 
liable for failing to make repairs to an area of the premises within 
the tenant's control. The decision is particularly significant because 
the landlord had never agreed to make repairs. The court's finding 
of an implied agreement to repair was unprecedented. In Young 
the Massachusetts judiciary became even further committed to its 
policy of protecting tenants. 
In Yanofsky, the landlord had expressly agreed to make re­
pairs. A customer, Mrs. Vahey, was injured when she slipped on a 
wet floor in the A & P store. A leak in the roof, which the landlord, 
Yanofsky, had failed to repair, brought about the dangerous condi­
tion. Mrs. Vahey sued both Yanofsky and A & P. Both claims were 
settled prior to the outcome of the indemnification action by A & P 
against Yanofsky. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
that, although no agreement to indemnifY existed, such an agree­
ment was implied from the agreement to repair. The entire finan­
cial responsibility for compensating the injured victim was placed 
214. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 729, 402 N.E.2d at 1045. 
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on the landlord. The court abolished the failure to repair rule and 
"nonfeasance" barriers to recovery by holding a landlord liable for 
failing to repair a defective condition on his premises after he had 
expressly agreed to make such repairs. The supreme judicial 
court's treatment of the indemnification issue is laudable. Yanofsky 
should serve as notice to all landlords in Massachusetts that, in the 
future, innocent tenants ultimately will not be responsible for 
compensating those injured on a landlord's unsafe property. . 
Residential tenants usually are considered less knowledgeable 
than their landlords. Social policy demands that these transient and 
often impecunious persons be protected. On the other hand, com­
mercial tenants usually are viewed as competent to take care of 
themselves. There is often no logical basis for this distinction, how­
ever, as the court in Yanofsky demonstrated by providing substan­
tial protection to a financially strong commercial tenant. Thus, reli­
ance on the distinction between residential and commercial leases 
to bar commercial lessors' potential liability, or to bar recovery 
against them in the form of indemnification, probably will fail. Fur­
thermore, extension of the Yanofsky and Young rationales indicates 
that an express agreement to repair will no longer be necessary in 
order for the courts to imply an agreement to indemnify. In future 
cases complete tenant indemnification should be the rule in all fact 
situations where the landlord has notice of dangerous conditions 
and reasonable time to repair. When this has been accomplished, 
the Massachusetts judiciary will have completed the task, begun in 
1973, of making landlord-tenant tort law responsive to contempo­
rary needs. 
Michael B. Powers 
